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Andhra Pradesh is a relatively underdeveloped State in south India that has 
become one of the leaders of the Indian reform process. How was this possible? With 
the help of eleven hypotheses, the paper discusses the politics of the reforms in 
Andhra Pradesh. The focus is particularly on the period between 1995 and 2004, 
during which an explicitly reform-oriented government ruled the State. The paper 
concludes that an important factor behind the reforms lay in the changing economic 
needs and aspirations of the initially rural-based classes/groups on which the 
reforming regime was based. Moreover, in contrast to some other Indian States, 
reforms in Andhra Pradesh were not introduced by stealth, but by hype, by a skilful 
and cleverly managing leadership that succeeded to suggest a break with the past 
while it continued with pro-poor spending and continued to allow policy 
implementation to be (mis)-used for local level party building. 
                                                 
a Previous drafts of this paper have been presented in Machilipatnam, the Institute of Social and 
Economic Change in Bangalore, the Centre for Economic and Social Studies in Hyderabad and the 
Institute of Social Studies, the Hague. I would like to thank the organizers and participants in these 
discussions for their comments, as well as Loraine Kennedy, Peter Mollinga and an anonymous referee 
of the ISS Working paper series. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
For students of economic reform processes, the south Indian State of Andhra 
Pradesh is an interesting case. When India started to liberalize its economy in 1991, 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) followed suit in a slow and modest way. Since 1995, however, 
the Andhra Pradesh State government has become one of the most active States in the 
Indian reform process. Between 1995 and 2004, the State was headed by a dynamic 
and reform-oriented political leader – Chandrababu Naidu. He was the first (State 
level) chief Minister who negotiated an independent loan from the World Bank. 
Although AP was not the only State implementing adjustment policies in this period – 
in fact, there are other States that started earlier or that have made more progress – the 
explicitness of the AP government and its overt attempt to make the economic reform 
policies part of a larger development and governance project, is what made the 
reforms more prominent and visible, and what attracted the attention policy makers 
elsewhere in India and abroad. 
That Andhra Pradesh would become one of the most explicitly reforming 
States was not exactly foreseeable. AP is a relatively underdeveloped State with a 
population of approximately 70 million people, depending predominantly on 
agriculture. Its literacy rate was 61 per cent in 2001 (as compared to 65 per cent for 
the whole of India) and its human development rank in 1991 was 23 (of 32 States and 
Union Territories in India).
1 Since the early 1980s the State has been known for its 
large-scale populism. The then chief minister, N.T. Rama Rao, a popular filmstar who 
became the founder and political leader of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP, a regional 
party in Andhra Pradesh), introduced several populist schemes. The best known 
programme was a large-scale food distribution scheme. The TDP was defeated in 
1989, but it came back to power in 1994, partly again because of its promise to 
revitalize the food scheme, as well as introduce other welfare policies. So, it was in 
this context of underdevelopment and backwardness coupled with a rather extreme 
form of welfarist populism that the explicit attempt to reform and a very committed 
leadership emerged. This situation lasted till April 2004, when new Parliamentary (for 
the federal government) and Assembly (for the state government) elections were held. 
                                                 
1 All figures from GoI (2002). 
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The reformist Chandrababu Naidu was defeated and a Congress (I)-led coalition 
government came to power. 
The central concern of this paper is: what were the reasons behind this policy 
shift in Andhra Pradesh? How could it happen that in this relatively backward State 
the reform process could get such momentum? This question remains relevant, even 
after the TDP lost the 2004 elections. After all, the answer may contribute to a further 
understanding of the circumstances under which reform agendas may be pushed. 
Andhra Pradesh can be seen as an interesting case that tells us something about the 
conditions under which reform agendas can consolidate. An additional relevance 
stems from the fact that the reform era did not end in 2004. The Congress (I)-led 
coalition is less explicit about its intentions, but does not seem to want to break with 
the past. 
This paper will approach its main question with a detour. There is a more 
general body of literature that tries to explain and interpret the politics of the reform 
process in India. Much of this is written by political scientists, and its main focus is on 
how reforms could consolidate in India. This is an intriguing question, indeed. After 
all, a similar attempt in the 1980s failed, India is a democracy in which opponents can 
easily mobilize themselves, and the main reformers in the 1990s were no others than 
the statists of the 1970s and 1980s. The paper draws from this more general literature 
to say something about Andhra Pradesh. So, in a way, Andhra Pradesh is a kind of 
case study to discuss the value of some more general theoretical insights on the 
politics of reforms. The main objective of the paper is, however, to say something 
about Andhra Pradesh, with the more general theoretical insights as points of 
comparison. 
One conceptual clarification that is perhaps required at the onset relates to the 
concept of reform. This term can be used in several ways. It can refer to 
macroeconomic changes regarding fiscal, monetary and financial policies, but it can 
also refer to changes in sectoral policies (in agriculture, industry or social sectors) as 
well as to changes in the system of administration or mode of governance.
2 In the 
broad sense, ‘reforms’ can refer to almost all policy changes that have taken place and 
that politicians and policy makers choose to present as  ‘part  of  the  reform  process’.
                                                 
2 See White and Masters (n.d.) 
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Both understandings make sense, and there is no best way to define reforms. Rather, it 
is an interesting question in itself why some economists, policy advisors, politicians 
or (senior) bureaucrats in certain circumstances work primarily with a narrow 
definition, while other people or the same people in different contexts, broaden up and 
include a much wider set of policy changes in the term ‘reform’. In this paper, the 
term is used in the broad sense. Reforms are all the macroeconomic and other 
(sectoral or governance) policy changes that are sometimes labelled as part of the 
reform process. 
The paper begins in the second section with a brief summary of the main char-
acteristics of the reform process in AP. Section 3 draws upon the more general body 
of literature on the politics of the reforms in India, and discusses the various ap-
proaches that have been developed to understand the consolidation of the reforms.
3 
The fourth section extracts the main ideas from this literature, and discusses these as 




2  REFORMS IN ANDHRA PRADESH 
In August 1991, briefly after the new Union Finance Minister had laid out his 
economic reform ambitions, the Government of AP also declared its commitment ‘to 
create conditions conducive for industrial development’ and introduced an ‘incentive 
regime which is amongst the most attractive in the country’ (Finance minister’s 
budget speech, August 1991: 5-6, quoted by Suri, 2005:136). Special schemes were 
formulated to attract investments from non-resident Indians, and a software 
technology park was established in Hyderabad. It was, however, especially from 1995 
onwards that the reform process in Andhra Pradesh caught real momentum. The 
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) had come back to power in Andhra Pradesh in 1994, and 
after an internal power struggle and ‘palace coup’ Chandrababu Naidu became Chief 
Minister in August 1995. He became an enthusiastic reformer and it is especially 
under his chief-ministership that lasted till May 2004 that the Andhra Pradesh 
government became one of the main advocates of the Indian reform process. 
                                                 
3 This is not a review paper. For a more exhaustive review and discussion of the literature, see Mooij 
(2002). 
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Soon after Naidu came to power, the TDP government brought out a White 
Paper on the status of AP government finances. The document emphasized the need 
for fiscal prudence, curtailing subsidies and addressing the issue of loss-making 
public sector undertakings. Around the same time the World Bank also did an 
assessment of the State’s financial position and came up with broadly similar 
conclusions, which were taken over by the government and found their way in various 
policy documents. In 1999, the AP government brought out the AP Vision 2020, a 
very ambitious plan laying down what the State should aim for in twenty years time.
 4 
It stated that, while the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, new avenues 
to growth are opened up. In order to capture these opportunities, the State government 
‘will need to transform itself and (…) adopt a new role: from being primarily a 
controller of the economy, it must become a facilitator and catalyst of its growth’ 
(GoAP, 1999: 8). 
Table 1 gives an overview of the main reforms undertaken between 1995 and 
2004. It shows that the plans and intentions went sometimes further than actual 
implementation. Nevertheless, a number of bold steps and unpopular measures have 
been taken, such as a power sector reform involving a steep price rise in electricity 
charges for a wide variety of consumers, fiscal measures including a cut in the food 
subsidy, and a partial lifting of prohibition.
5 There have been reforms in many policy 
areas, but the two areas the TDP leadership identified most with were the promotion 
of a modern industrial sector (most prominently information technology, but also 
pharmaceutical industry and biotechnology) and administrative reforms. With regard 
to the former, the TDP government actively promoted the development of Hyderabad 
as an IT city. It set up an IT park at the outskirts of the city (Hyderabad Information 
Technology and Engineering Consultancy, or Hitec city), housing more than 800 
companies. Andhra Pradesh became the fifth State in software exports (after 
Karnataka, Delhi, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra) and its exports have increased from 
Rs. 600 million in 1995-96 to more than Rs. 35 billion in 2002-03 (Kennedy, 
forthcoming). Pharmaceutical  and  biotechnological  industrial  development  are also 
                                                 
4 The document, according to some, is not only ambitious, but also unrealistic and blind to ground 
realities (Narasimha Reddy, 1999). The vision was prepared with the help of consultants from 
McKinsey. 
5 The partial lifting of prohibition was a significant policy change in Andhra Pradesh, because 
prohibition was the result of a widespread women’s movement in the State. 
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Table 1 
Reforms in Andhra Pradesh 1995-2004 
  Main reforms  Further comments 
Industrial Policy  Proactive measures, such as tax concessions, 
rebate on land; aggressive media campaigns 
to broadcast forward-lookingness. 
Various incentives for ICT and biotechnology 
industry in order to attract more foreign and 
domestic investors. 
 
Fiscal measures  Increase in price of rice that is distributed in 
the food distribution scheme. 
Partial lifting of prohibition. 
Attempts to reduce the number of government 
employees. 
 
Power  Unbundling the AP State Electricity Board into 
six companies; establishment of a Regulatory 
Committee; greater role for private sector 
(World Bank supported). 
Privatization of companies did 
not take place. 
Autonomy of the Regulatory 
Committee not realized. 
Privatization and 
disinvestments 
1997: state level public enterprises and 18 
cooperatives identified for privatization or 
restructuring (World Bank supported). 
 
By October 2002: 11 units were 
closed, 8 were privatized, 6 
were restructured/down-sized, 
while 15 were in the process of 
privatization or closure. 
Irrigation  1996-97: Irrigation reform, to introduce 
participatory irrigation management (World 
Bank supported). 
 
Elections were held in 1997 
and 2003. Project Committees 
at system level have not been 
formed. 
Health   Various health reforms, meant to upgrade 
services, increase cost recovery (introduction 
of user charges) and a larger role for the 
private sector (many initiatives are World Bank 
supported). 
Spurt in private sector health 
provisioning. 
 
Education  No major reforms. 
District Primary Education Programme 
(DPEP) was implemented (donor funded). 
Formation of self-help groups (teacher-parent 
associations; village school committees). 
There has been a spurt in 
private educational institutions. 
Poverty 
alleviation 
District Poverty Initiative Programme (DPIP) 
was introduced, initially in 6 districts, to be 
expanded to all districts (World Bank funded). 
Subsidized rice price increased in order to 
bring down the State food subsidy. 
Women self-help groups have 
taken off well in Andhra 
Pradesh. These groups are 
basically savings and thrift 
groups, but they are also 
involved in the implementation 




1997: Janmabhoomi programme (literally ‘land 
of one’s birth’), based on stakeholder groups. 
Its aim was to bring government to the people; 
it was based on voluntary labour contributions 
and involved microplanning at the grassroots 
level. 
This was a TDP flagship 
programme but lost much of its 
momentum over the years. The 
programme was instrumental 
for the TDP to strengthen its 
base at the local level. 
Governance and 
administration 
Introduction of various e-governance 
measures 
Introduction of performance assessments and 
bureaucratic targets. 
Establishment of the Centre for Good 
Governance (DfID funded). 
Establishment of stakeholder committees in 
many policy areas. 
Certain e-governance initiatives 
have been very successful, but 
others (e.g. electronic file 
movement) never took off. The 
Centre for Good Governance 
was for some time a flagship 
programme of the government. 
On the whole, despite a lot of 
rhetoric, ‘politics as usual’ 
continued. 
Sources: Kennedy (2004); Mooij (2003); Narayana (2003); Ramachandraiah and Patnaik (2005); Sreekumar, 
Thimma Reddy and Uma Rao (2003); Suri (2005). 
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actively promoted by the AP government, through sales tax concessions, rebate on 
land, exemptions from power cuts, exemptions from certain labour regulations and the 
establishment of the so-called Genome Valley (Joseph, 2003: 3928). 
With regard to the latter, administrative reforms, the TDP government coined 
the term SMART governance, where SMART stands for simple, moral, accountable, 
responsive and transparent. Among the most successful initiatives were the so-called 
e-sevas, one-stop counters for (mainly urban) citizens to pay their electricity and 
telephone bills, taxes, and for getting some licenses and permits. Another was the 
Computer-aided Administration of Registration Department (CARD) project, which 
(again mainly in urban areas) speeds up the registration of land transactions, tenancy 
agreements etc., and is supposed to reduce corruption.
6 With the help of a 6 million 
UK pounds grant from the UK government (Department for International 
Development), the Centre for Good Governance was established, meant to work on 
better policy implementation and improving the quality of the delivery system. The 
Centre did (and does) work, for instance, on citizen’s charters, performance 
assessments within the government and performance-based budgeting. 
Another area in which reform was initiated was irrigation. This involved the 
introduction of participatory irrigation management, and the Andhra Pradesh 
legislation in this area is seen by some as a model for how irrigation management 
reform should take place.
7 Most importantly, it involved the establishment of water 
users associations. This idea of involving stakeholders was pursued in many 
subsequent sectoral reforms and policies. Examples include watershed committees, 
village education committees and health advisory committees. The underlying idea 
was that stakeholder organizations would help in raising ownership and involvement 
in policy processes at the local level, financial contributions as well as government 
accountability and quality of services. The model was pushed by international donors, 
which have funded many of the sectoral reforms in AP, but it was also strongly 
endorsed by the TDP leadership. In fact, ‘Make a stakeholder of every citizen’ was 
                                                 
6 For a positive review of these initiatives, see Sudan (2000). 
7 Although the AP example is regarded elsewhere in India and in other parts of the world as very 
successful – the Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka legislations are almost literal copies of the AP 
Farmers’ Management of Irrigation Systems Act, 1997 –, others have come to the conclusion that in 
actual practice much less has changed than what was hoped for (personal communication Peter 
Mollinga, Centre for Development Research, Bonn, Germany). 
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one of the government slogans.
8 Altogether, the impression was consciously created 
that the AP reforms signalled a new development strategy. The model that was often 
referred to by the Naidu government was Singapore. There was even an attempt to 
copy particular infrastructural features of Singapore. The MMTS (Multi Modal 
Transport System) in Hyderabad is designed after the Mass Rapid Transport System 
in Singapore, and so-called Singapore townships were built at the outskirt of 
Hyderabad. The underlying idea of the strategy seemed to be that it is possible to 
leapfrog development by developing mainly knowledge-intensive industries, services 
and infrastructure. Although Vision 2020 had chapters on agriculture, poverty and 
social sectors, the thrust of APs development efforts between 1995 and 2004 was not 
on these areas, but on the potentially fast-growing modern sectors. 
Per capita growth has, however, not accelerated. At 4.1 per cent, the average 
per capita growth in AP in the nineties is still marginally lower than the all India 
figure (4.2%), while it is much lower than average growth in Tamil Nadu (5.5%) and 
Karnataka (5.6%). APs growth in the nineties is also much less than the 9.8 per cent 
average that was projected (for 1995-2015) in Vision 2020. With regard to poverty 
alleviation, AP is also doing much less well than its southern neighbours. 
Understandably, this poor performance has surprised and worried some of the 
advocates of the reform process, including the World Bank. A study undertaken by 
the Bank towards the end of Naidu’s regime (and published afterwards) listed and 
analysed the main reasons behind the low growth figures. It suggested to address 
these problems and to continue with the reforms, expecting that APs growth potential 
would eventually be ‘unlocked’ (World Bank, 2004). Also within the TDP leadership 
there seemed to be no doubt that it was on the right track with its reform agenda. 
Despite the change in policy rhetoric that has taken place during the period 
under review here (from welfare to development; from hand-outs to self-help), there 
was also continuity in policy making in the sense that the regime continued to be 
populist. The Janmabhoomi (rural development) scheme differs in its concept from 
the food distribution programme, in the sense that the former is based on 
                                                 
8 While stakeholder committees and self-help groups were formed in large number, the all-India 
Panchayati Raj legislation (73
rd and 74
th Amendment of the Constitution) was poorly implemented in 
Andhra Pradesh. According to a report of the World Bank, the panchayat institutions are ignored, 
marginalized and starved of funds (World Bank, 2000). Elections were reluctantly held in 2001, but 
funds were hardly devolved, and the (elected) district councils remain much less powerful than the 
district collector. 
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empowerment, self-help and stakeholders, while the food distribution scheme draws 
upon a ‘donative discourse’.
9 Nevertheless, it is populist in nature and partly meant to 
secure vote banks. Moreover, apart from these ‘modern’ stakeholder-based schemes, 
there continued to be a plethora of more traditional populist schemes meant for 
specific target groups (rural women people of traditional occupations, religious 
minorities, scheduled castes). Especially during election time, Naidu was, as Suri 
(2005:147) put it, ‘[l]ike a political wizard, (…) [pulling] out one welfare scheme 
after another from his hat’. In actual practice, many of these schemes suffered from 
lack of funds or poor implementation. They did, however, have a function in diffusing 
opposition to the regime and in reproducing a support base at the local level (although 
the trick did no longer seem to work in the 2004 elections). 
 
 
3  THE POLITICS OF REFORMS IN INDIA – APPROACHES AND 
EXPLANATIONS 
The dominant interpretation among political observers in India is that the 
reforms have been accepted by large parts of the population – in any case by those 
who matter in political debates and policy making – and that there is relatively little 
opposition. This is not to say that there is no opposition whatsoever or that the 
implementation went off everywhere smoothly as planned. But, by and large, all 
political parties have accepted the fact that India’s economy has changed or is 
changing from a state-led to a market-led one, and that a reversal to the earlier regime 
is unlikely. 
This wide acceptance and consolidation is intriguing. More in particular, two 
questions can be asked. The first is about the relationship between the reforms, class 
and the state. According to Bardhan’s (1984) analysis, India’s political economy in 
the mid-eighties was dominated by three proprietary classes: industrial capitalists, rich 
landowners and professionals within the state, both civilian and military, including the 
white collar workers in the public sector. These three classes pursue their own interests 
and are involved in various types of cooperation and conflict with each other, resulting in 
economic stagnation and a kind of policy deadlock. If this analysis is right, one  can  ask: 
                                                 
9 See Mooij (1995). See also Schaffer (1984) and Wood (1985:358-9) about donative versions of 
reality. 
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How was it possible that, in the 1990s, the state began to lead a reform process that, 
ideally, would result in its own withdrawal from certain sectors and that would go 
against the vested interests of the white collar workers? 
The second question is about the relationship between the reforms and 
democracy. This point can be illustrated with the help of Kohli’s analysis of Rajiv 
Gandhi’s failed attempt to reform India’s economy in the 1980s. After an initially 
successful start, according to Kohli (1989), opposition started to develop from many 
different quarters: the Congress rank and file, the opposition on the left, rural groups, 
organized labour in the public sector. As a result, Rajiv Gandhi started to worry about 
his electoral support and was forced to backtrack on the reforms. Kohli concluded that 
there are, apparently, ‘fairly sharp limits on how far and how fast a liberalization 
program, can be implemented in a democracy’ (Kohli, 1989: 324). Again, if this 
analysis is right, how was it possible that a fairly radical policy shift was possible in 




3.1  Reforms, Class and the State 
The literature provides three types of answers to the question of how the 
(Indian) state could initiate policies that, in the longer term, would threaten the 
interests of the state incumbents and that would affect the dominant coalition. The 
first is that the state itself has changed. State professionals may still be a proprietary 
class, but their position has changed, and so has the dominant coalition. The second 
stresses that the state is actually quite capable and able to implement the reforms, even 
in such a way that the main interests of the third proprietary class are not threatened. 
The third answer is that one should not overemphasize the role of the third proprietary 
class. An explanation of the consolidation of the reforms requires a more ‘society-
centered’ approach, focusing on the rise of a new class of industrialists or the role of 
international finance capital. 
One of the changes that has taken place within the Indian state is the shift of 
political power – from the traditional elites to the lower castes. Reservation has meant 
that the traditionally privileged groups have lost some of their easy access to the state 
                                                 
10 A third question, not discussed here, is whether or not a link exists between the economic reforms 
and the rise of Hindu nationalism. See Mooij, 2005: 32-35. 
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and its resources. Cynics may even argue, according to Bardhan (1998: 134–5) ‘that 
the retreat of the State, implied by economic reform is now more acceptable to the 
upper classes and castes, not only because the regulatory and interventionist State has 
become too burdensome for the Indian economy, but also because these classes and 
castes are losing their control over state power in the face of the emerging hordes of 
lower castes, and thus opting for greener pastures in the private sector (and abroad)’. 
State professionals now come, in part, from a more socially disadvantaged 
background. They may still see the state as their material base, but, as a result of their 
lower social status, one may hypothesize, their position vis-à-vis the other proprietary 
classes may have been eroded. 
This hypothesis fits Nayyar’s (1998) interpretation of an increasing mismatch 
between political representation and economic power. In his view, ‘[t]he rich 
dominate the economy now more than earlier, but the poor have a strong voice in the 
polity now more than earlier’ (ibid: 3129). This is precisely the nature of the disparity: 
the poor are included in the state and democratic processes, but this has not given 
them much power to influence economic processes. In fact, one can hypothesize that 
the relative importance of state professionals and politicians in economic policy 
making (as compared to the other proprietary classes) diminishes with the inclusion of 
more people from ‘lower’ castes in politics and the bureaucracy. 
A different (second) kind of explanation is put forward by several political 
scientists who stress the capacity of the state to reform, and the fact that the initiative 
for undertaking reforms came primarily from within the state, rather than from 
elsewhere. In other words, the state has sufficient capacity and autonomy, and state 
professionals were not held back by a deadly embrace by the other proprietary classes 
of the dominant coalition. Shastri (1997) locates the beginning of the reform process 
already in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when various committees headed by senior 
administrators who were more market-friendly than their predecessors wrote their 
policy reports. These ideas were further developed during the Rajiv Gandhi regime. 
Although many of the policy ideas could not be implemented, the ideological 
orientation of the key decision-makers and economic advisors continued to change. 
This process was helped by the entry of the so-called ‘laterals’ within the 
bureaucracy, who are usually relatively young, trained outside India (often in the 
United States), and possibly with prior professional experience in the World Bank or 
in the academic world. When faced with the hierarchy and rigidity of the Indian 
10  
bureaucracy, these laterals became reformers almost by default. Thus, the reform 
discourse grew in strength, and when the ‘windows of opportunity’ opened in 1991, 
the plans were ready for implementation.
11
Jenkins (1999) stresses the political skills of the main reformers and their firm 
belief they would be able to continue their ‘business as usual’. He gives ample 
evidence of the various ways in which reformers have been able to manipulate the 
reform process in such a way that their interests would not be threatened. Das (2005) 
and Mahalingam (2005) support his thesis. On the whole, they argue, reforms have 
not undermined the position of the Indian bureaucrats or politicians at all – and it is 
especially in sectors in which they could make money that reforms have proceeded 
well. In other words, as far as white collar professionals have collective or class 
interests, they seem to have made sure that these would not be threatened in the 
reform process. 
Skill is also related to personality and public image (building). Manor (1995), 
who described the reform process in the early 1990s as cautious, limited and well-
sequenced, gives considerable credit to the personality, experience and insights of the 
main actor in the process: P.V. Narasimha Rao. He was determined and consistent in 
his approach, and opted for a low-key strategy in order to avoid opposition. Rajiv 
Gandhi, however, whose reform attempt failed in the 1980s, was impatient, confused 
and inconsistent. The public image of these two politicians was also very different. 
Rajiv Gandhi was seen as modern, young, dynamic and an outsider to politics. 
Initially, this was an advantage, but very soon his emphasis on science and 
modernization was identified as pro-urban and pro-rich. Narasimha Rao, however, 
had a history in the old Congress party and was known for his intellectual capacities 
and caution. His own credibility spilled over to the reforms, especially since he had so 
far never been a rabid supporter of economic liberalization (Shastri, 1997: 51). 
The third answer to the question about how the state could initiate policies 
against the interests of the state incumbents is a political economy approach, 
emphasizing the role of non-state agents. Pedersen (2000), for instance, makes a 
strong case for a society-centered approach to the explanation of the consolidation of 
                                                 
11 According to Shastri (1997), the Nehruvian discourse has been effectively replaced by a new market-
oriented discourse. This interpretation is diametrically opposed to that of several others, who emphasize 
that the reformers downplayed (and had to downplay) the importance of the changes and obscured (and 
had to obscure) their real intentions, and that there is no ideological case. 
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the Indian reform process in the 1990s. Pedersen (2000) shows how Indian industry 
and business have undergone a ‘quiet revolution’ in the 1980s. The modern sections 
within business (engineering, electronics, software, computers, etc.) have become 
more important. In contrast to some of the older business groups, these modern 
sections favour de-regulation, de-control and de-licensing. They have organized 
themselves in the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). This confederation has been 
fairly successful in developing close ties with the Finance Ministry and other policy 
makers. It participates actively in public debates around the economic reform, and has 
been able to influence the economic policy agenda. So, Pedersen’s argument is that 
the rise of this new group of industrial entrepreneurs, in economic as well as in 
political terms, ‘constituted the key social change that was necessary for the reforms 
to be carried through’ (Pedersen, 2000: 276). The role of the ‘third propriety class’ 
should, hence, not be overestimated, according to Pedersen. ‘The political and 
bureaucratic elite, however important and powerful it may seem, ultimately depends 
on the matrix of social forces prevalent in every society for the carrying through of a 
major reform’ (ibid: 277). 
Other political economists have emphasized the role of international economic 
actors. Bhaduri and Nayyar (1996), for instance, state that in 1991, when the 
government was faced with a severe balance of payment crisis, it chooses to borrow 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This could have been a tactical move to 
‘provide India with breathing time and space to reformulate its policies and 
restructure the economy in accordance with national priorities and national objectives’ 
(ibid: 50). But this, according to Bhaduri and Nayyar, ‘was not to be’ (ibid: 50). 
Rather, international borrowing led to a ‘blueprint designed in Washington DC’, a 
development strategy that was not based on Indian ‘experience and learning’, but on 
‘outside thinking’ (ibid: 50–2). ‘The economic priorities of the people and the 
development objectives of the country were forgotten in the process’ (ibid: 51). So, 
rather than the national state with its class interests, this interpretation stresses the role 
of international financial institutions, or as Patnaik (2000) put it, the interests of 
international finance capital. 
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3.2  Reforms and Democracy 
Two types of answers can be found in the literature that addresses the 
relationship between reforms and democracy. The first is that, during the 1990s, 
India’s democratic bodies were occupied with issues other than reforms. In national 
debates and discussions, both inside and outside Parliament, reforms did not take 
centre-stage. The second explanation is that though India may be a democracy in the 
formal sense, the reform was implemented in a fairly undemocratic manner. 
The first explanation is put forward especially by Varshney (1999). According 
to him, scholars generally assume that once reforms are part of the policy agenda, 
they become a central issue in political debates (ibid: 222). This implies that there 
should be sufficient political support for them; otherwise, they are doomed to be still-
born. Varshney claims that this centrality of reforms need not be the case. In a 
situation where other issues dominate what he calls ‘mass politics’, reformers can 
proceed quietly as long as they refrain from policies that can turn into mass political 
issues.
12
Mass politics in India centers around identity issues. In the nineties, Hindu 
nationalism has been a rising force. Following the 1991 elections, the Hindu 
nationalist Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) became the second largest political party in 
the country after Congress (I). It had played a key role in the movement for the 
demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, and in the Hindu–Muslim riots that 
subsequently broke out in several parts of the country. Along with the issue of job 
reservation for lower castes, this led to mass politics centering around social and 
communal identities. The main political parties started to realign accordingly. In 
Varshney’s words, ‘[c]oalitions were increasingly formed against Hindu nationalists, 
not against the Congress. To begin with, the left – the Communists and the lower 
caste Janata Dal and its allies – disliked the reforms, but they disliked Hindu 
nationalism even more’ (Varshney, 1999: 247; italics in the original). Subsequent 
budget proposals could get passed by Parliament, not because the opposition parties 
                                                 
12 Varshney makes a distinction between elite– and mass politics. ‘Elite politics is typically expressed 
in debates and struggles within the institutionalized settings of a bureaucracy, a parliament, a cabinet. 
Mass politics takes place primarily on the streets. Touched off by issues that unleash citizen passions 
and emotions, the characteristic forms of mass politics include large-scale agitations, demonstrations, 
and civil disobedience: riots and assassinations are also not excluded’ (1999: 223). The difference be-
tween elite– and mass politics is thus of a) interests affected, b) the arena of the debates and struggles, 
and the form that these debates and struggles take, and c) the participants in these political contests. 
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were in favour, but because Hindu–Muslim relations and caste animosities had 
become the prime determinants of political coalitions (ibid: 248). 
The second explanation is particularly elaborated by Jenkins (1999). 
According to him, the reforms were implemented through underhand and often non-
transparent tactics, made possible by the way in which democratic institutions work in 
practice. Indian politicians, Jenkins argues, could introduce fairly radical policy 
changes, because they were confident that the reform would not fundamentally alter 
either the political arena or their privileged position. Interest groups would continue to 
remain malleable, and new coalitions would emerge. Two types of institutions are 
particularly highlighted by Jenkins: namely, federal and political party institutions. 
The effect of the federal system has been the diffusion of opposition, while political 
parties function as networks of influence that can be used by politicians when 
negotiating policies and accommodating interests. In short, India’s democracy did not 
create a hurdle at all. On the contrary, the actual functioning of the ‘democratic’ 
institutions enabled reformers to develop their clandestine tactics to introduce the 
reforms without much opposition. 
A similar point, i.e. that the Indian state is not so democratic after all, is made 
by Patnaik (2000). According to him, the reforms have gone hand in hand with the 
abridgement of democracy. The support base of the reforms is very narrow. Only a 
small group of people are involved in economic policy making, and many of them 
have previously been employees of the IMF or the World Bank. Individual media 
persons or academic researchers are influenced, or rather co-opted, through well-paid 
assignments. Independent critical academic work is more difficult to undertake as the 
universities have increasingly become market-driven. Moreover, the political arena 
itself has changed as a result of the liberalization policies. According to Patnaik, 
globalization    in    India    has    intensified    communalism,    fundamentalism    and 
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secessionism.
13 These divisive forces have acquired new potency and have even led to 
a shift in the political discourse – away from economic policies and towards socio-
cultural and ethno-nationalist identities. As a result, it has become easier to implement 
reforms (cf. Varshney, 1999). 
 
 
4  THE POLITICS OF REFORMS IN ANDHRA PRADESH 
In this section, I first list the various hypotheses implicitly or explicitly 
implied in the explanations discussed above, before I move on to discuss their value in 
the context of Andhra Pradesh. 
Firstly, there is a set of related hypotheses stressing the independent role of the 
state and state incumbents. 
1  It is the clever management and political skills of the policy elite (consisting of 
politicians and senior bureaucrats) that is important in the consolidation of 
reforms. 
2  Reformers have been able to make use of the various formal and informal 
institutions of India’s democracy. (This hypothesis also fits under the third set, 
focusing on the characteristics of India’s democracy.) 
3.  It is basically the personality and public image of the main reform advocates 
that matters. If they succeed to build an image of dynamic and trustworthy 
leadership, they may be able to convince the electorate of the necessity, 
benefits and feasibility of reforms. 
4  A new market-oriented discourse was developed from within the state. This 
discourse gradually gained in strength and started to influence ways of 
thinking about the economy. 
                                                 
13 This is so because, while globalization decreases the importance of national consciousness, sub-
national consciousnesses are strengthened in the process (ibid: 247). Moreover, economic policies 
create winners and losers, and thereby secessionist tendencies. ‘The advanced regions (…) think they 
have a better chance of attracting foreign investment from the [multi national companies] if they are 
unencumbered by the company of backward regions. (…) ‘Backward’ regions on the other hand 
develop a secessionist tendency since they feel they are getting a ‘raw deal’, accounting for the 
perpetuation of their backwardness’ (ibid: 247). Finally, the economic policies and globalization 
generally may lead to reactionism, especially among those who are negatively affected. These people 
observe others to become richer and indulge in lavish consumerism. Since the rich are increasingly 
identified with the West, the anti-elite feelings may easily develop into anti-Western feelings, which 
can be a fertile breeding ground for fundamentalist movements (ibid: 247–8). 
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Secondly, there are two related hypotheses about the changing ‘dominant 
coalition’. 
5  The dominant coalition has changed, partly as a result of the entry of people 
from ‘lower caste’ background in the bureaucracy and politics. This has 
weakened the position of the ‘third proprietary class’ vis-à-vis the other two 
partners in the coalition. 
6  The upper and middle classes, including the white collar workers, supported 
the reforms because they promised to offer better employment opportunities 
than the state-led model of development, especially because reservation 
policies had restricted their access to government jobs. 
Three hypotheses focus particularly on characteristics of India’s democracy. 
7  Reforms were introduced by stealth. The importance of new policies was 
downplayed and the electorate was fooled. 
8  There have been contingency factors. Because mass politics focused on other 
issues (such as communalism or identity politics), the reforming elite could go 
ahead, as long as they would not venture into policy areas that would touch the 
masses negatively. 
9  The reforms could sustain themselves because an abridgement of democracy 
has taken place. 
Finally, there are two hypotheses focusing particularly on class relations. 
10  A new group of entrepreneurial industrialists has become economically and 
politically important in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This class has been 
able to influence the economic policy agenda. 
11  The reforms are pushed by international financial agencies that represent the 
interests of finance capital. 
This is a long list of hypotheses, but in the case of Andhra Pradesh some elimination 
can be done immediately. The 7
th hypothesis, for instance, emphasizing the stealth 
element, does not hold. Reforms in Andhra Pradesh were not introduced by stealth; on 
the contrary, they were introduced by hype and publicity. If there is one State in 
which there was a lot of openness about the government’s reform intentions, it was 
Andhra Pradesh between 1995 and 2004. There may have been some secrecy now and 
then about some particular measures, or about likely (negative) outcomes of some 
policies (Ramachandraiah and Patnaik, 2005), but on the whole the political 
leadership did not hide its intentions. This openness was a conscious strategy of the 
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TDP leadership, and seemed to have worked well in its relation with donors. It made 
Andhra Pradesh a darling State of the donors, and it gave the reforms in AP a special 
status. AP became a kind of test case for the donors in India, and the reforms, 




th hypothesis, emphasizing the role of contingency factors in 
diverting attention, has not much relevance in AP. Communalism and (religious or 
caste) identity issues have, on the whole, not detracted the attention of the electorate 
from the reforms. The argument that progressive people thought it would be more 
important to fight for secularism (together with Congress) than to fight against the 
reforms (together with the rest of the opposition, including the Hindu-nationalist BJP) 
may hold for India as a whole in the early 1990s, but not for Andhra Pradesh. Since 
1998, the Telugu Desam Party was part of the (central) coalition headed by the Hindu 
nationalist BJP. This meant that, within Andhra Pradesh, the pro-secularists could 
easily form a coalition with the anti-reformers, and fight the BJP, the TDP and the 
reform policies in one go. This, however, has not happened.  
Since 2001, there are, however, two other issues that are not related to the 
reforms but that might have detracted political attention from the reforms, namely the 
drought experienced in parts of the State, and the idea of a separate Telangana.
15 The 
drought issue was used by both the TDP as well as the opposition party: the ruling 
TDP blamed the drought for the occurrence of deaths in the summer and for the 
difficulties of agriculturalists. The opposition argued that the government failed to 
address the difficulties of the farmers and the rural poor. The issue of a separate 
Telangana was put on the political agenda despite the ruling TDP. The TDP would 
                                                 
14 The result was that the donors could not be too critical about the reform progress and process, and 
had an interest in pretending that everything was fine in this State. See, for instance, Report No. 
PID10910 from the World Bank (dated January 25, 2002; italics added) that states that ‘Andhra 
Pradesh’s reform program is owned and under implementation by a highly committed and reform-
minded government. The state’s strength includes a strong track record in reform, a capable 
bureaucracy and a high growth potential. These strengths would mitigate risks associated with the 
reforms.  Moreover, the success of the GoAP reform program is expected to have considerable 
demonstration effects across states in India. Given its already-established position as a reform leader 
in fiscal, power and governance areas, Andhra Pradesh has the potential to set precedents, and to help 
generate reform competition and momentum across India’ (point 6: Report downloadable from 
www.worldbank.org). 
15 Telangana is the least developed region of the three regions that make up the State of Andhra 
Pradesh. The struggle for a separate Telangana is as old as the State itself, which was formed in 1956, 
but it has flared up again in 2001-02, among other things with the emergence of a new political party 
fighting especially for a separate Telangana. 
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rather have it struck off and focus on the need for reforms. Both issues have become 
important only in 2001, and have not played a role in the initial years of enthusiast 
reform initiatives. 
All the other hypotheses, however, seem to have some explanatory value. The 
first two hypotheses focus on the clever management, political skills, and ways in 
which Indian institutions function. These are, indeed, important elements of the way 
in which the AP reforms were taking place between 1995 and 2004. First of all, Naidu 
was a very competent and clever politician. This does not only mean he knew all party 
workers by name, but also that he was able to juggle with different discourses and 
policy practices. Good governance, for instance, was hailed as an important new 
phenomenon. There was a repetitive promise to root out corruption and become the 
best-ruled State in India. At the same time, ‘business as usual’ continued in almost all 
implementation practices: contractors were closely allied to the ruling party; fixed 
percentages were paid as bribes for various people instrumental in clearing the deals; 
policy implementation meant party building at the local level.
16 Similarly, talk about 
the need for fiscal prudence went together with a continuation of various populist 
programmes and pro-poor subsidies. The rice subsidy was reduced in 1995 after 
Naidu came to power, but many new schemes, sometimes meant for specific target 
groups, have been introduced later on. The TDP leadership, as Kennedy (2004:65) 
also notes, was able to combine open support for the reforms with a continuation of 
pro-poor subsidies. By juggling these various discourses and practices, Naidu tried to 
appeal simultaneously to many different constituencies: the world outside AP, the 
urban middle classes, his own Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), his 
rural party workers and the electorate. 
It would be mistaken, however, to interpret this situation only in terms of 
political skills and management. The point is also that the introduction of the reforms 
did not lead to a discontinuation of earlier policies and practices. This means that it is 
possible to formulate a twelfth hypothesis, namely that the reforms in AP could be 
                                                 
16 A rather extreme example of this was the ‘Food-for-Work’ scam, in which a considerable percentage 
of the 3 million tonnes of foodgrains meant for drought relief was diverted to the open market or sold 
back to the Food Corporation of India between September 2001 and September 2002 (Deshingkar and 
Johnson, 2003). But also in other programmes local cadre building happened with development 
schemes and funds. Manor (2004: 265) narrates that the Chief Minister, at a gathering of party activists 
in the context of the Janmabhoomi (rural development) programme, said that he would allow if one 
third of the funds would be ‘eaten’ up. 
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introduced because they did not lead to a fundamental break in either pro-poor 
schemes or in ways in which resources were distributed through political networks 
and used for local party-building purposes. 
Coming to the third hypothesis, there is no doubt that Naidu was the central 
figure in the reform. When he took over from his father-in-law, Naidu was in a 
difficult position: he did not have the same charisma as N.T. Rama Rao, who had, 
moreover, secured a massive election victory less than a year ago. He therefore had to 
develop another image, a source of legitimacy and support base that would distinguish 
him from his popular predecessor, and that would present him as a ruler in his own right. 
He found this image in computers, technology, modern management and reform-
mindedness. He orchestrated a considerable amount of publicity around his person, 
stressing especially his commitment to reform, hard work, genuine ambitions for the 
state and modern outlook. As a result, he was seen as the main personification of the 
reforms. On the one hand, this was important for the consolidation of the reforms. His 
own faith, enthusiasm and hard work spilled over and added credibility to the process, 
if not in Andhra Pradesh, then certainly outside the State. On the other hand, however, 
his own centrality also undermined the effort. Suri (2005) argued, for instance, that 
the opposition parties had little choice but to oppose the reforms. There was no other 
way to fight Naidu than to fight the reforms. Moreover, it also meant that ownership 
of the reforms was limited. Even within the TDP, the rank and file did not always 
agree to Naidu’s reform initiatives, although they could not express this openly. 
To conclude, the first three hypotheses have value in the AP context. At the 
same time, they do not explain the content and the direction of the reforms. They are 
about skills and persons, and describe the process of the reform: how it was managed, 
and the centrality of the person of Chandrababu Naidu. But they do not explain the 
consolidation of the particular set of reform policies. The same skills could have been 
used for the introduction of reform policies with a different content. 
It is therefore useful to proceed with hypothesis 10 about the importance of 
class interests. This explanation is also put forward by Srinivasulu (2003) in a paper, 
in which he discussed the class background of the TDP phenomenon. The TDP, he 
argues, could emerge and become important, not only because N.T. Rama Rao was a 
charismatic filmstar/politician, but also because there was a clear niche for anti-
Congress politics in the State (see also Srinivasulu, 1999). The agrarian rich, who had 
come up especially after the Green Revolution, the backward caste middle peasant 
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and the educated middle class all felt that their prospects to come up were reduced by 
the Central Congress politics. While the first disagreed with the Congress pro-land 
reform position, all these groups felt excluded as a result of Congress’ strategy to 
accommodate and incorporate especially the traditional landed gentry in its political 
structure.
17 They were therefore willing to support the TDP in large numbers.
18
In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, this rich and entrepreneurial class of 
people, often with their roots in agriculture, diversified into cinema, business, service 
and manufacturing industry.
19 ‘A faction of this class’, according to Srinivasulu 
(2003) ‘has shown aggressive growth, especially in the Information Technology and 
pharmaceutical sector’. They were so successful that, by the 1990s, ‘this class 
[measured up] to take on even the monopoly class in the competition’. The permit-Raj 
was a bottleneck for them in their further development and expansion, and they 
welcomed the reforms.
20 When these business groups felt the TDP under N.T. Rama 
Rao was becoming too caught up in fiscally unsustainable welfare populism and was 
no longer pursuing their interests, they were instrumental in an internal TDP coup that 
brought Naidu to power. Very prominent and vocal among this class were the Eenadu 
(media) group and the owners of Viceroy Hotel. The Eenadu newspaper supported 
Naidu’s coup and his policies, and the Viceroy extended its hospitality to the 
dissenting MLAs during the coup. Almost immediately after he took over, Naidu 
became a reform-oriented politician (even though he had defended the earlier populist 
welfarist policies as a Finance Minister under N.T. Rama Rao). 
In sum, Andhra Pradesh has witnessed a kind of ‘quiet revolution’ within the 
initially agricultural bourgeoisie. There is also an ideological component to this 
                                                 
17 Andhra Pradesh produces rice and no wheat. The productivity increase as a result of the Green 
Revolution was much more in wheat than in rice. Nevertheless, the Green Revolution was important in 
AP. There was a huge expansion of surface irrigation (and hence of acreage and production of rice) and 
the Government of India introduced a system of secured procurement at fixed prices.  
18 Thus, while in some other States (Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka and Punjab) the middle 
caste farmers who had benefited from the Green Revolution and had become rich, started to agitate for 
more farmer-friendly policies and formed the so-called ‘new farmers movements’, in AP this group of 
articulate and aggressively enterprising farmers found a place in a new regional party, the TDP. 
19 See also Baru (2000: 215- 219) for a description of the career trajectory of some first-generation 
regional entrepreneurs in Andhra Pradesh. The entrepreneurial spirit of this class of people goes a long 
time back. Upadhya (1988) describes the entrepreneurial strategies of the coastal Kammas from the late 
19
th century onward. The Kammas benefited from increasing irrigation possibilities, invested in 
education, property and business, and started to migrate to other parts of India where new irrigation 
schemes were developed. 
20 The term ‘permit-Raj’ refers to an extensive system of regulation and, to a certain extent also 
protection, of private entrepreneurship by a powerful state bureaucracy. 
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revolution. Some of the upwardly mobile communities (many are Kammas, Reddys 
and some are Kapus, and many are from the more developed Krishna-Godavari delta) 
have invested successfully in the education of their children.
21 There has been a large 
expansion of educational facilities in the State, particularly in the area of private 
professional education. The education in these institutions, according to Srinivasulu, 
together with the rapidly expanding electronic media and consumerist boom, changed 
the aspiration of many people. Moreover, tens of thousands of these educated doctors 
and engineers went abroad, often to the US (Joseph, 2003: 3926). All this had a 
profound effect on the lifestyle, aspirations, ambitions and points of reference of this 
class of people. 
It is not only that this class of people is politically well organized and able to 
influence the AP leadership. The relationship is much more direct. From the start 
onwards, the main support base of the TDP was located among these groups of 
people. But while their initial demands could be met by putting the land reforms on 
hold and by changes in the rural administrative structure, their further economic 
success required more drastic policy changes.
22 What this illustrates is an interaction 
between different kinds of explanatory factors, i.e. state (policy)-focused and class-
focused ones. To put it simply, the Green Revolution policy helped a new class of 
enterprising agriculturalists to emerge. In Andhra Pradesh, these people have 
supported the regional Telugu Desam Party that was founded in 1983. The TDP 
policies under N.T. Rama Rao have further helped this upwardly mobile class. They 
diversified their activities considerably, and were so successful that they started to 
‘demand’ a regime shift. 
This interpretation that highlights the interrelationship between state-led 
processes and class developments is different from the 5
th hypothesis, which stresses 
the erosion of the position of the third proprietary class vis-à-vis the two other 
dominant classes. The position of the state and state incumbents does not seem to be 
weaker or substantially different during Naidu’s regime from that in the mid 1980s. In 
both periods, policies were formulated to meet the demands of the upwardly mobile 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately, no empirical studies have been undertaken to systematically map the caste 
background of APs industrialists. 
22 N.T. Rama Rao abolished the feudal institution of village officers, a position that was usually held by 
(Congress affiliated) members of the traditional elite. Similarly, he restructured the mandals (a sub-
district administrative structure), opening up positions for the elites of backward communities 
(Srinivasulu, 1999: 218-9). 
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entrepreneurial class, while at the same time the regime had to think about its own 
survival, securing the support of elected representatives, and the (re)production of 
vote banks; the difference is only in the type of policies preferred by the 
entrepreneurial classes. 
It is hard to assess the validity of the 6
th hypothesis, which is about the 
changing appeal and prospects of jobs within the state, especially for the higher/richer 
castes/classes. There is no doubt that attitudes are changing, and that a position within 
the government is less aspired now by these groups of people than in the past. The 
expansion of opportunities outside the government for well-educated adolescents, the 
increasing wage differentials in the public and private sector, the widespread 
aspiration to migrate to the United States, have all contributed to this changing 
attitude. It may be that reservation policies have contributed to a further support for 
the reform policies, but this is hard to prove. 
Where does hypothesis no. 4, about the strength of the new discourse, fit in? 
The regime shift effected by Naidu had a clear discursive component. Most 
importantly, there was a shift away from a discourse centering around welfare to one 
centering around reform, development and governance.
23 This earlier discourse, as 
mentioned before, could be characterized as ‘donative’, since it stresses hand-outs, 
charity and welfare provided by a benevolent ruler, i.e. N.T. Rama Rao.  In a way, the 
new TDP policy discourse was technocratic,
24 as it stressed administrative (better 
monitoring and assessments; performance-based incentives etc.) or technological 
solutions (e-governance) to problems of corruption and poor government 
performance. But, although there has been a discursive shift, it has never been 
complete. Populist rhetoric remained important for the TDP, especially during 
election time. Moreover, it is hard to argue that the new discourse has functioned as a 
kind of independent element in the push towards reforms. Rather, it was consciously 
developed after 1995 in an attempt to justify and legitimize the reform policies. 
The 11
th hypothesis, which emphasizes the role of international agencies, is 
popular among leftists in the State. At first sight, there seems to be a lot of evidence to 
confirm this hypothesis. International agencies have been very important in funding 
                                                 
23 See Harshe and Srinivas (1999) about this shift. 
24 There is, however, also a political component to the new policy discourse: the emphasis on 
stakeholders, ‘active participation of the people in the development of the state’ and on people 
becoming ‘partners in progress’ (GoAP, 1999:1-2). 
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and promoting the reform process in AP, the World Bank foremost among them (see 
table 1). This fact, however, does not necessarily mean the World Bank pushed for 
them. It is more likely that, although the World Bank and some big donors (especially 
DfID) gave indispensable financial support, the reforms were welcomed and 




th hypothesis about the abridgement of democracy is noteworthy. 
There have been scholars in Andhra Pradesh arguing that this abridgement has taken 
place, indeed, in particular with the establishment of the various stakeholder 
committees. Krishna Reddy (2002), for instance, has argued that the Janmabhoomi 
(rural development) programme helped Naidu to depoliticize development. By directing 
attention mainly to local issues, many of which are related to governance in a rather 
technical sense, Naidu would have succeeded in insulating the reform process from 
democratic procedures and people’s participation (which was by and large reduced to 
non-economic issues). It therefore helped him to go ahead with the reform process. 
Krishna Reddy’s argument is hard to prove. It is, however, likely that the stakeholder 
programmes were meant to enhance the legitimacy and support base of the TDP regime 




5  BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this paper has discussed the politics of the reform process in 
Andhra Pradesh, a State that was an active reformer between 1995 and 2004. The 
paper has argued that there are a number of factors explaining the reform process. 
Most importantly, there has been a change in the economic base and entrepreneurial 
strategies of the initially rural-based class/groups on which the TDP regime was 
based. This conglomerate of (initially) middle and rich peasants, some from backward 
                                                 
25 It might be, however, that this domestic support was much less in relation to reforms in health, rural 
development and other social sectors. For instance, the government promised to set up a Poverty and 
Social Analysis Monitoring Unit, but delayed this for years (interview with DfID official, New Delhi, 
December 2002). The interest of the GoAP in the AP Health Strategy and Expenditure Framework, 
developed in early 2003 by a consultancy team in preparation of further reforms in this sector) was also 
very meager (author’s own observations). 
26 See also Powis (2003), who analyses stakeholder associations as part of a political strategy, rather 
than a development intervention. Powis suggests that stakeholder associations are primarily 
arrangements in which new rural leaders can emerge and be accommodated. 
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caste backgrounds, educated middle classes and rural/agrarian entrepreneurs, has 
diversified its economic activities over the years and has been very successful in a 
number of business, service and manufacturing sectors, even to the extent that the 
permit-Raj started to become a bottleneck for its further expansion outside the State. 
From its inception, the TDP has been based on the support (financial and otherwise) 
of this class, and its policies, when in power, have (among other things) catered to the 
needs of this group of people. In the process, the party has helped to further the 
expansion and success of the economic activities of this class. The 1995 regime shift 
reflects the rise and changing policy needs of this class. At the same time, it has also 
been argued that despite rhetoric of fundamental changes, practices of party 
consolidation at the local level, (mis)use of funds as well as pro-poor social subsidies 
continued to exist. A considerable measure of political skills is necessary, and was 
evidently present in AP, to combine the various rhetorics and satisfy the divers 
interests. 
An intriguing question is why Naidu chose to be so explicit about his reform 
intentions. He could have done the same things and satisfied his supporters without so 
much publicity, as has happened in other parts of India, where reform was introduced 
by stealth (Jenkins, 1999) rather than hype. In a paper comparing the different 
rhetorical strategies of Andhra Pradesh’s and Tamil Nadu’s government (the first 
‘trumpets’ loudly, but ‘does less than it announces’, while the latter is much more 
discrete but in actual practice does more than what it announces), Kennedy (2004) 
mentions a few reasons. One is that Andhra Pradesh, in contrast to Tamil Nadu, is 
known to be a relatively underdeveloped state, which would create an incentive for 
the leadership ‘to ‘go overboard’ in projecting visible signs of [its] commitment to 
market principles’ in order to appeal to potential investors (p. 64). More importantly, 
according to Kennedy, are domestic political calculations. While Tamil Nadu has an 
increasingly fragmented party system, in which voting blocs are negotiating their 
support to particular political parties on a case-by-case basis, Andhra Pradesh has a 
much more stable bi-polar political system. Moreover, both the Congress and the TDP 
in Andhra Pradesh are based primarily on support from the so-called forward castes, 
while they use strategies of accommodation to secure the votes from the lower castes 
and poorer classes. Identification with policy that could be considered as pro-rich is 
therefore less harmful for them than for the main parties in Tamil Nadu, which have 
identified much more explicitly with their lower caste/class base. 
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These reasons may explain, indeed, why it seemed not detrimental to Naidu’s 
electoral prospects to adopt an explicit pro-reform position (although this assessment 
might have been wrong: he lost the elections in 2004). That in actual practice he chose 
to do so is perhaps a historic contingency. Naidu needed a public image that would 
distinguish him from his charismatic father-in-law. And subsequently, the image has 
proved to pay off, in any case in the State’s relations with international donors, who 
became as interested in a success story as the TDP leadership itself. 
The defeat in the 2004 elections may be taken as a sign that Naidu’s strategy 
to hype the reforms was perhaps unwise. The dominant interpretation of his electoral 
defeat was, indeed, that it was due to the way he pushed the reform agenda. At first 
sight, this interpretation seems to make sense. After all, the ruling BJP/NDA (National 
Democratic Alliance, which included the TDP) had done its best to convert the 2004 
elections into a referendum on its economic development record. Throughout the 
campaign, the NDA had used slogans such as ‘India Shining’ and the ‘Feel Good 
Factor’, emphasizing India’s economic development and status as a superpower. The 
opposition parties, too, especially at the State level, had tried to make the economic 
reform policies into an election issue. In Andhra Pradesh, the Congress opposition 
labeled Naidu an ‘agent of the World Bank’, and accused the TDP government of 
indiscriminate privatization, neglecting farmers and pursuing lopsided development. 
This suggests that, to a certain extent, the electoral outcome can be interpreted as a 
verdict against the reforms. 
There are, however, several reasons to be cautious. First of all, Naidu lost 
many seats, but his loss in terms of voting percentages was less dramatic. As Table 2 
shows, the TDP secured still 38.5 per cent of the votes in 2004, even though its 
number of seats was reduced from 180 to 47. Congress (I) also lost votes, but won in 
terms of seats, and together with its partners it won 226 of the 296 Assembly seats. In 
order not to split the opposition vote, Congress (I) had entered into seat alliances and 
coalition agreements with several other political parties, and that strategy paid of, and 
became a decisive factor in the 2004 verdict. Secondly, it is very hard to draw general 
relationships between voters’ opinions on reforms and electoral outcomes. Based on 
electoral surveys pertaining to the general elections in 1996, 1998 and 1999, Kumar 
(2004) concludes that not only can one find reform advocates and opponents among 
voters for all political parties (including the Left), but also that a large majority (more 
than 70 per cent of voters in 1998) was not even aware that something like an 
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economic reform process had taken place in India.
27 This is not to say that voters had 
not experienced any reform impacts – even being unaware of the policy – but it does 
mean that one cannot assume a simple relationship between opinions about policies 
and voting behaviour. 
Table 2 
Election Results AP Assembly (1999 and 2004) 
 2004  1999  Loss/gain 
  seats % seats % seats % 
Congress 185  38.5  91  40.6  +94  -2.1 
Congress+ 226  48.6       
TDP 47  37.5  180  43.9  -133  -6.4 
TDP+ 49  40.2  192  47.5  -143  -7.3 
Others 19  11.2  9  8.5     
Source: Suri (2005: table 5.4), based on CSDS data. 
Congress+ includes Indian National Congress, Telengana Rashtra Samithi 
(TRS) and the left parties. 
TDP+ includes the TDP and the BJP 
Others include all other parties and independent candidates. 
To conclude, what the Andhra Pradesh case seems to suggest is that also in 
economically backward States that have a history of rather extreme welfare populism, 
it is well possible that dynamic and reform-oriented leaderships emerge. In AP, this 
was partly related to the individual ambitions and skills of a new generation leader, 
but it was also highly contingent upon a much longer-term transformation that had 
taken place within APs political economy: the economic diversification and success of 
a particular class of initially rural-based farmers/entrepreneurs. With the TDP in 
power, this class was able to influence the economic policy agenda directly. The 
electoral victory of Congress (I) in 2004 may have caused a small political set-back. 
Given the economic dominance of this class, it is, however, unlikely that subsequent 
non-TDP governments will go much against the interests of this class. 
                                                 
27 The question asked was: During the last five years, the central government has made many changes 
in its economic policy (policy regarding money matters, tax, Indian and foreign companies, 
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